Interviewed by Ronald E. Doel
Tape 11 side 1
- Doel: In our last interview, we talked about your work at
Columbia University, and we've covered a lot of it, but there are
a few questions that I still wanted to return to. Did you have a
good understanding of the research work that your other colleagues were doing, Charles Berkey, Roy Colony, and Armin Lobeck?
Were you involved in any way in discussing their work with them?
Did you have much interaction with them at all?
Hubbert: Nothing at all.
- Doel: That's interesting. Because what you were doing was so
different from their research?
Hubbert: Just no common ground. I used to give lectures in some
of Berkey's courses.
- Doel: Which course was that?
Hubbert: When he was out making money in a private consulting.
He spent a good deal of his time doing that. That was one of the
things that I had against Columbia. Almost all the faculty was
engaged in one kind or another of outside consulting. They
neglected their academic work in favor of outside renumeration
from consulting.
- Doel: Was the administration at Columbia aware that this was the
practice?
Hubbert: Oh, I presume they were.
- Doel: Did these people, your colleagues, need that for financial
support, or was it a matter of choice, do you feel?
Hubbert: Oh, probably both.
- Doel: I was wondering too, was there ever a regular seminar that
people in the department attended?
Hubbert: Oh, they had an informal organization. I forget what
it's called. It was made up of graduate students and faculty,
and met in the evening. I remember I often attended, maybe once
a month or so, on some assigned topic or topics. They'd have
students reporting on various things. But that's the only common
ground that I recall.
- Doel: Did most of the faculty attend those meetings?
Hubbert: Yes. It was a kind of an all-department affair.
- Doel: Was there also much after-hours socializing? Did you get
together with other members of the faculty?
Hubbert: Well, I would say that the members of the faculty who
were more personally compatible probably did a fair amount. I
found most of the social contacts with the faculty boring. So I
avoided them.
- Doel: Were there any other contacts?
Hubbert: There was very little to talk about of any importance.
- Doel: Were there any people at Columbia you particularly valued?
That you did talk with?
Hubbert: Well, perhaps the one single individual in the faculty
that I was most intimately associated with socially was a professor of political science by the name of William C. Casey. He had
formerly been a professor at Chicago before he came to Columbia.
Then he'd been in a college down in central Illinois. In fact
he'd been thrown out of the place because he taught the students
a little too much about banking. The chairman of the board of
trustees was president of the local bank. So they fired him. He
went to Chicago and then to Columbia.
- Doel: Columbia and New York City was the area where Howard Scott
was, and the Technocracy movement. You were involved in that.
Hubbert: Yes, that's right.
- Doel: Do you recall the first time that you met Scott, how you
became involved in it?
Hubbert: I think so. There was organized down in the Village a
club called the Meeting Place. It was made up of professional
writers and newspaper people, and architects. It was professional level people. And it occupied what was principally a dining
room, also a minimal social lounge, over a restaurant on the
ground floor called Lee Chumleys. So that they could have meals
served from Lee Chumleys restaurant up there, but it was primarily just an informal social gathering place. So after I'd been
there for about a year, one of the secretaries in the department
invited me to go down to this place, to meet this very interesting person.
- Doel: This is Howard Scott?
Hubbert: This is Howard Scott. And I did. And I was pretty
much bowled over with the man's scope, knowledge, understanding.
It led to a personal friendship, and then the Depression got
deeper and deeper. This was about 1931, say, and I kept pushing
him to try to get some of the things he was talking about on
paper. It was the same kind of thing I'd been working on about
mineral resources, energy resources, and so on. And the employment problem. And I should remark by way of background, that
following World War I, he had been one of practically a leader in
a small group of a dozen or so people called the Technical
Alliance. I used to have their little leaflet of organization,
people who were in the main line-up. I can only quote it from
memory, but one of them was Tolman? later the dean of the
graduate school of Caltech, Richard Tolman, and leader in the
field of statistical mechanics. He has a big book like that on
the subject.
- Doel: Right.
Hubbert: And he was one of that group. This was largely a group
that had been associated one way or the other with World War I,
military production including the Wilson Dam on the Tennessee
River, the big associated air reduction plant for nitrogen, and a
whole bunch of those things. And so after the war, or out of
this wartime association and experience, these people kind of got
together and formed this little group who were asking fundamental
questions about the society in general. Wouldn't it be better if
we did things this way instead of this way, etc. One other
thing, I'm trying to remember some of their names. Richard
Tolman. I think Steinmetz was peripherally involved, at General
Electric. The other man who was not in that group but associated
it was Stuart Chase, the writer on economic subjects during the
thirties. They had quite a number of conferences and discussions, and outside people came in and were members of these
discussions groups. One of them was Veblen, and Veblen wrote a
book, ENGINEERS IN A CRISIS, out of that association. There was
another man I think was from Columbia and I can't remember his
name now. He wrote a penetrating book called DEALING WITH
CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL PROBLEMS. It was a highly read and regarded
book in the late twenties and early thirties, but I can't remember the author's name at the moment or the name of the book. I
think he was professor of history, maybe, at Columbia.
So it was a group of that general nature that had died out during
the twenties. Then I come along and hear Scott with all his
background, and I tried pushing him to try to get things going
again. The Depression got deeper and deeper. Oh yes, two other
people at the old Technical Alliance. One was an engineer named
B. Jones who was a leading consulting engineer in New York state.
He had a big consulting engineering office on Park Avenue, I
think about 40th St. and Park Avenue. Another was Freddie
Ackerman who was one of the top architects in New York. He had a
big architectural firm. And these men came back, said, "Let's
get going." The other thing was that the Depression was getting
deeper and deeper and more and more desperate, with more and more
people in the breadlines, including the professional people of
the engineering societies and the society of architects. Yet you
had this dogma of the time that, oh, by God, we couldn't have the
dole. Everybody has to work for a living. So how did you work
when you sold apples on the corner of 42nd St and Fifth Avenue
and so on? They were doing that. It seems we couldn't have
government support, that would be a dole. So the engineers were
supporting their own unemployed members and the architects were
doing the same with theirs. Paying them a living wage. So
that's where B. Jones for the engineers and Ackerman of the
architects proposed that we start using these unemployed engineers and architects to start putting some of this stuff together. And so we organized them into teams to go into the engineering society's library, the New York Public Library, and after
specific information, primarily various kinds of mineral resources, and energy resources, coal, oil, iron, various metals, and
then plotting these up into graphs.
- Doel: Of course you'd had an interest in that from the time
you'd taken Bastin's course at Chicago.
Hubbert: Yes. And then I got a man by the name of [unclear] who
was a professional in industrial engineering at Columbia, and
talked with him at the Faculty Club, got him interested. He
provided some of the drafting facilities and space at Columbia
University for some of these men to do their drafting work.
Well, this went along, and it broke into the press, oh, about
1933. Somebody saw this work going on, some reporter. "What's
this?" "Well, it's an energy survey." "Energy survey, what's
that?" Then they saw these big charts and so on and they got all
excited, and this thing broke out all over the newspapers. Then
there was a terrific hue and cry developing from people who
wanted to help, what could they do? Well, there was no organization and no way of utilizing their interest or their desire to
help. Again, one of the fundamental things, before they could do
anything, maybe was education. So then well, Scott used the word
Technocracy, that's a word he coined himself, by way of contrast
with bureaucracy or plutocracy or democracy and so on, because
the social structure that he was visualizing was none of the
conventional things. Instead of that it was a social structure
whose fundamentals were the energy and mineral resources, and
whose accounting system was based on physical relations, thermodynamics and so on, rather than a monetary system, hence the
contrast that his was not a plutocracy or any other conventional there's no social system in existence that was based on
the principles that he was talking about. He coined this term,
Technocracy, as describing what he had in mind, as contrasted
with the conventional divisions, social divisions. And well, in
order to have some kind of an organizational structure, we then
had a lawyer who was a friend, at one of the big law firms in New
York state, draw up the papers of incorporation and get it
through a judge who had to approve it as incorporated here in New
York called Technocracy Incorporated. That was a structure in
which we could rent an office, and have a minimum sized staff,
mostly volunteers, and could also begin to do some internal work
by way of organizational structure.
- Doel: And this all occurred right after the publicity in the
early 1930s?
Hubbert: That's right. Finally, after about four years, there
was a turnaround in the press, where they began to be very
critical. Then we got all kinds of hell from the press, whereas
before they almost had [unclear]. And in the meantime, why, we
got out various publications, regrettably nothing of great
importance. What I wanted to do was to get on to the technical
writing, but through the emergency of the situation, the demand
of the public to have something to do, we had to try to get some
kind of an organization operating. I drew up a kind of a small
study course of the basics of what we were talking about, for use
in these small groups that were assembling around. That was
published in a small booklet without authorship. It was called
"Technocracy Study Course." They also put out a little magazine
which was more, I'm sorry to say, political than technical. But
it did have some fairly good technical papers. All this ran on
through the thirties. By the end of the thirties, I'd come to
the conclusion that the thing wasn't going to accomplish anything
I was interested in. The technical part of it simply wasn't
going anywhere.
- Doel: Was that because the leadership at that time was less
interested in the technical aspects, do you think?
Hubbert: Well, this thing just moved along rather spontaneously,
the circumstances. So I lost interest in it and gradually pulled
out entirely. I thought I was wasting my time. So that's when I
went to Washington to the Board of Economic Warfare, and put it
on the shelf.
- Doel: OK. I did want to ask you some questions about that. How
did you get involved in that work with the Economic Resources
Board? How did that come about?
Hubbert: Simply, it was a new organization, and my friends in
Washington knew that I'd been tremendously interested in this
problem of resources. They suggested that I get into the Board
of Economic Warfare, which I did.
- Doel: What was the work that you were doing on the board?
Hubbert: Oh, I was senior analyst in mineral resources. And I
was working principally with mineral resources around the world
of military interest.
- Doel: Was that the goal of the larger group?
Hubbert: The Board of Economic Warfare was the title of it. It
was principally concerned in a broad way with not just mineral
but all kinds of resources as related to the propagation of the
war.
- Doel: Who did you report to?
Hubbert: An economist. I can't remember the name now. A
professor of economics from some school or other. I never heard
of him before, never seen him since.
- Doel: This was full-time work for the two years that you were
involved in it?
Hubbert: That's right.
- Doel: Did you have other responsibilities in addition to this?
Hubbert: Oh, I had a small group of two or three people working
with me. But we just were in one of these great big bullpens
about 100 feet long and 50 feet wide, with desks laid end to end.
It's a very interesting experience, incidentally. Until that
time, I never had anything but a private or semi-private office
since I was a graduate student. I was frankly scared stiff. I
could visualize myself just going nuts, trying to work under that
kind of conditions. I was really apprehensive about it.
- Doel: You'd known it would be that kind of working environment,
before you went down?
Hubbert: Yes. When I first went down there, they didn't have
any home. They were scattered around, a few people here, a few
people there. Commerce Department, for example, and various
other places. So my first office was an office that was intended
for I think one person in the Commerce Building, and what did
they have? They had four desks, one here, one here, one there,
one there, each one with a telephone, but all four of them
unrelated to each other. So in that case, when anybody had a
telephone conversation, it wasn't that you were interested, it
was an interruption, you couldn't help but listen to the conversation. And if a messenger came in say for Joe over here, you
couldn't help but wonder, who is the messenger and what are they
talking about, out loud, interrupting what everybody else was
doing. Well, that was the kind of thing that I was apprehensive
about. Finally then we moved in to one of these big temporary
buildings, where you had big bullpen rooms, and a main corridor
down the way here and desks practically touching each other.
Just as peaceful and quiet as anything.
- Doel: Is that so ?
Hubbert: You knew what you were doing. You knew what your
colleague over here was doing. You didn't give a damn about what
they got over across the way, what they were doing ten feet away.
- Doel: That's interesting.
Hubbert: Perfectly quiet, peaceful, undisturbed atmosphere. You
just ran your own little show, they ran theirs, nobody bothered
each other.
- Doel: Did you have much contact with outside geologists during
the time that you were working together there?
Hubbert: Geological Survey people were working at the same time
on military geology.
- Doel: Right.
Hubbert: And that was the time, when I moved into this thing,
where the people I was associated with didn't understand what I
needed. I needed a drafting board and I needed to do library
work, either personally or send somebody to the Library of
Congress, the Geological Survey library, or whatever source of
information there was, for whatever we needed. And it took some
little time to get a drafting board because that was unorthodox,
and necessary tools including some drafting instruments, and
things of that sort. But gradually, why, we got things under
control and working right smoothly.
- Doel: What happened to the Board after 1943, when you decided to
leave?
Hubbert: Well, it kind of went into a political tailspin. I
don't remember the details now. I didn't know anybody that was
running the thing. Vice President Henry Wallace was chairman of
the board, you might say, overseeing this thing. They had a man
by the name of Perkins from Houston. He'd written Wallace a very
enthusiastic letter and Wallace was so impressed that he invited
the man up and put him in charge of this Board of Economic
Warfare. And another man from Houston who owned and practically
was boss over at the bosses of Houston was a man by the name of
Jesse Jones. Jesse Jones was the power behind in Houston he
owned half the town, he and his colleagues. He was made chairman
of the board of I'm trying to remember what they called it. Back
in the Depression days, he was on the bank board of....
- Doel: Part of the alphabet soup agencies?
Hubbert: Yes, that bailed out the bank in Chicago.
- Doel: I believe I know which one it is. We'll check on that.
Hubbert: The same one that got bailed out again recently, I
think. What do they call this thing? It dates back to the
Depression days or maybe even earlier. But in the Depression
days, his principal duty was bailing out bankrupt banks. Dawes.
Dawes was the Secretary of the Treasury, I believe.
- Doel: That's right.
Hubbert: They bailed out Dawes's bank. Then he resigned and
left and went back to Chicago.
- Doel: That's interesting. I wasn't aware of that.
Hubbert: One of his principal activities was getting money for
his bank. Well, by the time I speak of, World War II, this
organization still existed but it was moribund. It had no reason
for existence, except just then continuity of bureaucracy.
- Doel: Had the military geology branch of the service taken over
much of its former responsibilities?
Hubbert: No, they were self-contained. They were Geological
Survey strictly working directly with the military. There was
another large body that was more or less parallel to the Board of
Economic Warfare, and that was called the War Production Board, I
believe. That was a different group of business men, industrialists.
- Doel: Did you have much contact with them?
Hubbert: A little bit. Not very much. But to get back to this
group, Jesse Jones became the head of this organization. He had
very little to do, but here were all these resources, metals,
quinine, rubber, around the world, that they had field men out
buying the stuff up. Somebody had to pay for it, and so this
organization, Jesse Jones, was put in the position as a purchasing agent for the government. Roosevelt set Jesse Jones up in
that capacity. And one very interesting little incident that
came up during this period, around 1943 or thereabouts. That's
when the Japanese were taking over the Malaysian Peninsula area,
which was the world's principal source of rubber plantations.
Well, they'd hauled out a lot of rubber before the Japanese took
over, and had it stored in big warehouses here in the U.S. It
was very very critical material, because we didn't have synthetic
rubber then. It was about to be developed about this time.
- Doel: That's right, but it wasn't yet out commercially.
Hubbert: So this episode occurred. I don't remember if it was
in the newspapers or what but anyhow it was generally known what
had happened around town.
Tape 11 side 2
Hubbert: So there it was that one of Jesse Jones's aids came
into his office one morning in a state of alarm to report the
disastrous news that one of the big warehouses full of irreplaceable Malaysian rubber had burned down overnight. Jesse wasn't
disturbed in the slightest. He said, "Well, it was insured,
wasn't it?" He didn't lose a cent. (Laughter)
- Doel: That's quite a story.
Hubbert: I regard that as a very significant incident in the
contract industry, wartime or peacetime, not on money, but on oil
and iron and copper and biological materials and so on. The
money is an accounting system. To Jesse Jones, money was the
ultimate and only reality. It didn't bother him in the slightest
if they had burned down a warehouse of irreplaceable Malaysian
rubber. He didn't lose a penny.
- Doel: Is that one of the reasons that you decided it was time to
go?
Hubbert: No. That's just an incident. Jesse Jones apparently
hated the ground that this guy Perkins walked on. And so he
pulled every dirty political trick and he had lots of influence
on Congressmen, against Milo? Perkins. The thing got so bad, I
was fairly disgusted with it. I was taking another look at the
oil industry, and I got a telegram or telephone call, I don't
remember which, from an old long time friend of mine, physicists,
who was a research man for Shell in Houston. It said, "I'm
coming to Washington with a very interesting proposition."
- Doel: Coming specifically to visit you?
Hubbert: Yes. So he came with an offer of a job in Shell
research. Under the circumstances, I was fed up with the situation here. So I said, OK, I'll take it. That's how I went to
Shell.
- Doel: OK. I want to turn to Shell in a moment, but there are a
few more questions in the intervening period I wanted to ask you
about first.
Hubbert: OK.
- Doel: To return to Columbia, were there any other individuals,
particularly scientists, who you felt were important, that you
had associations with while you were there?
Hubbert: Not particularly. See, we were dealing with subjects
that were so unorthodox that the ordinary person knew nothing
about it. And so there wasn't any commonground. You could only
talk about this kind of thing to people who had done some thinking of their own. If you're dealing with people, engineers say,
whose sole concern was designing machinery and electronic equipment or something of that sort, and you're off on things of
social importance, it's outside of their domain of interest and
there is nothing you can talk about. So this kind of thing has a
very special requirement, by way of discussion and conversation.
And so the man with whom I was the most intimately associated at
Columbia was this professor of political science, sociology.
He'd been in political science at Chicago.
- Doel: OK.
Hubbert: But he had a grasp of understanding of social phenomena
that compared with which all the technical people at Columbia
were neophytes. Or ignoramuses. Now, one man in Columbia whom I
barely knew at the time but was much impressed with was a Belgian
who came there in the mid-thirties, 1936 or so, by the name of
M.I. Biot. He was a first-class man in applied mechanics of
international stature. He was very highly regarded in the
technical circles of engineering and so on at Columbia. I later
ran into him at the 6th International Conference on Applied
Mechanics in Paris in 1946. We were both there. Geologists from
Belgium, I guess. And so we renewed and extended this slight
acquaintance we'd had at Columbia. And I raised the question.
We were setting up a research laboratory there, one of our
provisions was that we would hire very special people from the
outside as consultants.
- Doel: This is the research laboratory at Shell?
Hubbert: Yes, at Shell. And we'd established this laboratory
the year before, in 1945. And this was '46. So I propositioned
Biot as to whether he would be interested as an outside consultant to our shop. He said he would be. I came back and reported
it to my chief and he was rather negative.
Doel; Why was that, do you think?
Hubbert: Well, in the meantime Biot, who was head of department
in New York, and spent most of his time in New York, went down to
Shell and talked with the executive vice president who was a
Belgian, rather a Dutchman but right on the border of Belgium.
These two just hit it off like almost brothers. So when my boss
went to New York next time, his boss was so impressed with Biot
that he changed his mind right rapidly. We hired Biot as a
consultant who worked with us until after I left. Then Shell was
cutting down on a lot of their research shortly after that. Biot
shifted over and got a similar connection with Mobil? research
laboratory in Dallas. Later he spent most of his time back in
his home territory in Belgium.
- Doel: What kind of contact did you have with him at Columbia?
Hubbert: Very little. I knew who he was and I knew about him
principally second hand. I talked with him a little bit. But I
was working on this theory of ground water motion at the time. I
remember discussing with him some aspects of that. I also wrote
this theory of scale models, and gave him a copy of it. He was
very pleased with that. But aside from that, we were just on
different sides of the campus and there was no ordinary casual
grounds for association, so I hardly saw him. But I knew who he
was and I was one of his admirers.
- Doel: Were there any discussions of Wegener's hypothesis at
Columbia?
Hubbert: Very little. Wegener was very largely a neglected
person in the field. And the reason was reasonably obvious, and
that is that we had this notion of the earth as a fundamentally
rigid body. This notion of floating continents was just incompatible with what we knew or possibly knew about the earth at the
time. When I wrote the theory of scale models, one of the
principal accomplishments in that paper was a considerable
resolution of the paradox between various strong rigid rocks, and
material that behaved like a soft plastic. We had the evidence
of both in early geological phenomena.
- Doel: Right.
Hubbert: What I showed was that it wasn't really paradoxical
provided that you took a look at this thing on the basis of the
scaling up and down of your various physical properties. To
illustrate the point, let's just take a cube. This cube has a
certain density, and so its mass is the volume times the density.
Pressure at the bottom due to its weight is the weight divided by
the area of the bottom and that's the square of this, the volume
is the cube. So, working around the other way, suppose that
we're dealing with some very large object. Something the size of
oh, a few hundred meters' extent, or even a thousand kilometers.
- Doel: You mentioned the state of Texas once as a good example.
Hubbert: Yes, exactly. I used that as an illustration. So,
suppose that you wanted to build a table-sized model. It would
behave, under its own weight, like the block the size of Texas
would behave, made of the materials, of ordinary rock and so on.
Well, if the density was the same, you would reduce if we used
say L2 over L1 Lambda for the strength ratio, so then the volume
ratio would be Lambda cubed. The area ratio would be Lambda
squared. And so, if you then solve this number 2 system in terms
of these fundamental ratio that we have here as to strength
ratio, it turns out that you would have to decrease the strength,
say, if you wanted the same strength to stress, in the model as
you had in the original, if the stress is being reduced by Lambda
cubed over Lambda squared, then the strength would have to be
reduced by the same amount. If Lambda is one part in a million,
then what you have to do here is to reduce the strength of this
material a millionfold. What would that be like in ordinary
materials? Well, toothpaste would be much too strong. It was
this kind of thing that got us out of that bind of models made of
strong solid rocks versus earth deforming drastically as if it
were made of weak materials.
- Doel: You mentioned that Jim Gilluly was one of the readers of
the paper. How much of a contribution did he make in terms of
your thinking?
Hubbert: Not very much. He read it as a critical referee what
can you do better or what's wrong, weak, or needs more explanation. There was actually very little critical comment. What is
was was an editorial type comment. And was properly respected.
- Doel: What sort of a man was Jim Gilluly? As you knew him?
Hubbert: He was a very very refreshing person. He was a very
outgoing, action-oriented Irishman, not a fat Irishman, but a
lean Irishman (unclear). He'd grown up at the University either
the University of Washington or what do you call that, Spokane? I
don't know. It may have been Spokane. He got his bachelor's
degree there. I think he then maybe went to the University of
Washington in Seattle, because one of his professors was later
the head of the mathematics department at the original Caltech.
He was a very highly regarded mathematician at Caltech. In his
later years he wrote three or four books on various aspects of
the history of mathematics. Very very informative books. He was
an Englishman or Scotsman, I don't remember which.
- Doel: Was that E.T. Bell?
Hubbert: Yes. E.T. Bell, right. One of his books was a little
book called WHAT IS TRUTH?
- Doel: Did you read that at the time?
Hubbert: Yes.
- Doel: Was there much reaction among geologists to the scale
models paper, immediate reaction?
Hubbert: Oh yes.
- Doel: Did they accept that fairly quickly?
Hubbert: It was one of my more honored papers. Spontaneous
immediate acceptance. Never any argument about it. I've often
written papers that took 20 or 30 years to reach such status. In
fact, that committee that I was on, I.C. somebody, about a year
before I came on, in the Minutes of the preceding year, indicated
that among the things that had suggested them was a theory of
scale models, in structure of geology. So when we got through
with this term that I was on, two of the people on the committee,
one was Daly of Harvard and the other was more or less a Daly
student, Francis Birch, in physics. Both of them were working
very close together and they had this little group of people,
graduate students and so on, who grew up under them, working on
these properties of rocks and what not for several years.
Francis Birch was one of them. David Griggs was another. In the
bull session of this committee, after hours, I was in a conversation with Daly and whoever else was around. I told this little
story of having seen these models of Hans Cloos in 1933.
- Doel: Right, in Washington.
Hubbert: And I'd gone back to my hotel room and did a little bit
of theoretical work on it. I had concluded that what Cloos did
was approximately correct. It surprised me at the time. Well,
Daly was fired up right away over this remark.
- Doel: He hadn't seen the demonstration by Cloos?
Hubbert: Oh, he knew about it, yes. But he didn't know my
interest. So I mentioned the work that I did know about by
another Dutchman who had done some scale model work, some work on
turbidity currents, ocean currents and so on. He gave me references to this man's work which I did know about before. Then
when the committee got through its work and was winding up, the
question came as to who would do what. Francis Birch said he'd
handle this immediate problem on a handbook of rock properties.
I said, "Well, I'll take on this problem of scale models." That
was the time when David Griggs was about to do a job, a laboratory model job, of hand-cranked cylinders and floating overburden,
folding, the various ways where the stresses were being applied
to the floating crust, so to speak, by convection currents in the
subsurface. Well, Griggs was holding off until I wrote this
paper. And when I wrote the paper, then he went ahead and did
his job, and it was a very remarkable piece of work. It would be
much more favorably received now than it was then, because the
drifting continents and what-not are very much in confirmatory.
Griggs's work was more confirmatory than it was considered to be
at that time.
- Doel: Was Griggs deeply interested in the Wegener hypothesis?
Do you remember that?
Hubbert: Well, these things were all in the air. Daly was a
very original, provocative, thoughtful man, and he shed off on
his students and associates his own musings. So Griggs did this
little paper, and I remember he gave it at the forthcoming
Geological Society meeting. He had a motion picture showing
these things running, and one of them turning, and the other one
stationary, how this thing built up one way, both of them turning, and a whole series of combinations. Well, after he'd
read the paper, one of the old timers in geology, a very influential person, was a Scotsman by the name of Andrew Lawson. He had
been the czar of the geology department at Berkeley most of his
life, after the 1930's. He was a tough-minded old gentleman, and
he got up after Griggs's paper, and said, "Thank God "....
- Doel: This was his comment on David Grigg's paper?
Hubbert: Yes. The word was that "I'm not that"
- Doel: It's a particular word?
Hubbert: Yes, the word was very appropriate.
- Doel: When we get the transcript back, we can insert it.
Hubbert: Yes, OK. "Thank God I'm not " well, naive. There's a
better word, but the idea was the same.
- Doel: He was deeply critical of Griggs's presentation, then?
Hubbert: Yes.
- Doel: Do you recall the reaction of other people who were there?
Hubbert: I think that the attitude in general was one of open-mindedness. But this old gentleman, Andy Lawson the missing word
there was exactly right to express what he had in mind. It
wasn't stupid, it wasn't naive. Credulous, of a credulous
nature.
- Doel: Don't trouble yourself with that. Finally, was there
anybody at all at Columbia with whom you could discuss the
possibility of enhancing physics during the time that you were
there?
Hubbert: Well, that whole operation there, as I say, the geology
department at Columbia, was a very tightly self-contained little
enclave. The head of the department was a man by the name of
Charles Peter Berkey, who superficially was a nice, kindly guy
and a gentleman. Actually, behind that facade, he was... again
the right word skips me. But he was anything but a kindly
fatherly grandfatherly person.
- Doel: Really?
Hubbert: It was only this facade. He was actually a very
autocratic person. And what he had been, in fact it's what I
came by, he'd been a long time secretary of the Geological
Society of America. He practically owned the Geological Society
of America.
- Doel: You mean in terms of setting their program?
Hubbert: He was the editor, among other things, of their BULLE TIN. He manipulated its internal affairs considerably and so on.
And he had arranged in a deal [unclear] what had been residential
buildings, in a neighboring block that he bought. He got one of
those as headquarters for the Geological Society. And about that
time there was a man by the name of Penrose who had made a pile
of money in mining. Penrose gave them I think about six million
dollars.
- Doel: That was one of the most major endowments for geology.
Hubbert: A very major endowment. Berkey continued on in this
capacity for oh, four or five years, maybe. Then he got an
assistant secretary, who was training really to take over.
- Doel: Which man was this?
Hubbert: Henry Aldrich. But poor Aldrich was just beaten down.
He was treated like an office boy. Berkey dominated everything.
So it wasn't till Berkey retired-and he only retired because of
illness, I believe-did Henry Aldrich take over and run the thing
from there on out. Berkey was an autocrat. He ran the geology
department autocratically the same way. In most of the staff he
built up, it was his gang, you might say. So with regard to
geophysics, they didn't have any more idea than a jack rabbit of
what geophysics really was about. All they wanted was to teach
the barest little bit about how to run a magnetometer and what it
did, and torsion balance, and a few things of that sort. The
whole thing was so damned superficial. What he wanted was
utterly ridiculous.
- Doel: Did he exercise a strong influence on what other depart ment members were doing, field geology or petrology?
Hubbert: Oh, very much so. All the young men who came up got a
[unclear] also. They hired a whole bunch of their students.
Tape 12 side 1
Hubbert: What you had here was a whole group of yes men. And
Colony, for example, was a man that Berkey hired out of Cooper
Union, working up some lectures there. Colony was a teacher of
chemistry in the place, and Colony got interested in this lecture
that Berkey had given on the chemistry of rocks. He expressed an
interest in getting into Columbia and Berkey hired him. He
became Berkey's number 2 man in petrology. So with one excep tion, the one senior professor who was not a Berkey student, was
Dr. C.W. Johnson. C.W. Johnson was a thorn in Berkey's side, and
Berkey couldn't do anything about it, and Berkey hated it.
- Doel: What was Johnson's research interest?
Hubbert: Geomorphology. Johnson actually was the most competent
scientist in the department. But again, he operated as an
outsider, and he was a very close friend of Nicholas Murray
Butler.
- Doel: Oh, really? That helped.
Hubbert: They couldn't do anything about him.
- Doel: That's interesting. Yes.
Hubbert: But Johnson was intellectually demanding and critical
so the best graduate students in the department were Johnson's
students.
- Doel: How well was the department in general held by other
departments of geology? What kind of reputation did it have
Hubbert: I really don't know. But I didn't know people in other
departments well enough at the time.
- Doel: Right. You mentioned Berkey's influence on the GSA. Did
he also have strong influence in determining what kinds of
research projects the Penrose Fund would take on during his term?
Hubbert: Yes. I'll give you one illustration. There was work
going on with the Coastal Geodetic Survey mapping these submarine
canyons, by acoustical mapping of soundings.
- Doel: Right. This is during the 1930s?
Hubbert: The 1930's. And there was a man who was involved in
this on the interpretive side, who was a well known geologist, by
the name of Paul Smith. He was working with one of the engineers
of the Coast Survey. I remember when this geologist came up to
see Berkey about the possibility of getting some money for this
project. The conversation went on. Anyway, I was in on part of
it. It was just kind of casual. And I remember Berkey taking it
right over, he says, "OK, so and so," whatever the man's name
was, " yes, I'll give you so and so much money." No committee,
no nothing. "I'll give it to you."
- Doel: As if they were his funds.
Hubbert: Yes. That little incident is very characteristic.
- Doel: Was there in fact a committee?
Hubbert: No. No.
- Doel: It was simply
Hubbert: Berkey simply. "I'll do it."
- Doel: OK. That's fascinating. There were also funds available
within Columbia University for research. Were you ever given a
grant from Columbia to do your own work?
Hubbert: I think I got $250 once.
- Doel: Was that a small amount at the time, or large?
Hubbert: It probably was small. But when I first went there, I
wanted to get going on this broader subject of geophysics. And
my course was based on those premises. Till Berkey reports one
day, "Well, now, X Oil Co. has got some torsion balances they're
not using any more, and we can buy one for $2500" or something of
the sort. "Shall we get one?" I said, "Well, what would we do
with it? Take the students around and say, here is a torsion
balance?"
- Doel: As a demonstration?
Hubbert: As far as the theory goes, I don't need the torsion
balance for the theory. If it's a matter of using it, why, you
can only get 22 observations a day with this thing. Why you'd go
out and do field work with this thing, I don't know. So why
spend $2500? Another thing. "It would be great if Columbia
University had a seismograph. We could call up the newspapers
and say, at Columbia University we got an earthquake on our
seismograph. Or we could take students around and administrators
and say, here's the Columbia University seismograph, it traces
earthquakes." That kind of thing. Now, we're right on Amsterdam
Avenue, with big heavy traffic, automobiles and trucks going by
all day long. The thing would be going like that, as far as the
seismograph was concerned. Not only that, but there was a big
seismic station ten miles away at Fordham University, fairly
elaborate. So why should we have a seismograph? In the first
place, the thing wouldn't work. Secondly, we have no use for it.
It isn't the right location. So I didn't go for that.
What I really wanted was a little shop where I could build
equipment. I finally inherited one that somebody or other had
there as a kind of a unofficial friend of somebody they gave him
a little office shop in this building. When he died and I took
over the little shop and all the equipment. Again, as far as
office was concerned, I had an office, but I always had an office
mate of some kind, sometimes a graduate student. Oh yes.
Another thing I was doing was developing the course in structural
geology. There I ran into a problem that I hadn't anticipated.
The structural geology that I was familiar with, like the Lake
Superior region, Wisconsin, Minnesota and so on, have very
tightly folded rocks and cut off, truncated by erosion and so on.
But not much metamorphosed. The rocks in New York city were very
highly metamorphosed rocks, and so you've got three practical
series, the oldest rocks are Fordham Gneiss which is a granite
gneiss. Overlying that is marble, and overlying that was a
schist. This schist used to be a shale but it is now so thor oughly micaceous you can't even see original bedding in it any
more. This kind of highly metamorphosed rocks I was very unfa miliar with, and the relations of structural geology that I was
familiar with just didn't apply here at all. So later on, I
went with one of the other professors of paleontology at Columbia
for a field course up in the Catskill region, and a dozen stu dents or so. I went with him on this field course.
- Doel: Do you recall who this was?
Hubbert: Corielle. Well, that was very informative, because
these were glacial rocks. There was at least one place where
there was an overthrust of fallen paleozoic rocks, but these
rocks were essentially unmetamorphosed. They contained fossils
so that you could identify every outcrop practically by its
fossils. Then there were thrust faults where there were repeated
rocks and so forth, cross-sections. That was all very very
informative and useful. Across the river from New York City were
the Palisades, which is this big lava flow there, or intrusion.
In the middle of it is a zone, a strain of about ten or fifteen
feet thick of pure olivene which has apparently settled down in
the process of precipitation. I remember hearing Berkey comment
one day with obvious displeasure that one of the graduate stu dents was over poking around this olivene layer. He didn't like
it worth a damn because he had written on that subject already
and he didn't want anybody messing with it.
- Doel: He was that autocratic?
Hubbert: Another thing about Berkey was the utter triviality of
the man's interest in geological problems, and this was fairly
typical. Around New York City there are the rock outcrops in
Central Park. There were some up on the northern tip of Manhat tan, and of course there were some limestone outcrops around the
edges, and one or two isolated ones scattered around the Bronx
and Queens and so on. Berkey assigned one of the graduate
students the job of just going around and describing these
individual isolated outcrops, because they were going to be
destroyed by the building one of these days and he wanted to
preserve them for science. No problem at all, just uttermost
trivial sort of thing. And that was his notion of scientific
investigation.
- Doel: What did the graduate students think of that?
Hubbert: Well, there was one case, toward the end of my sojourn.
There was a graduate student by the name of Keppel whom I didn't
know. I mean, I'd seen him. I think the Journal Club is what
they called this geological meeting that happened once a month,
and I saw him there. Johnson by this time was chairman of the
department, and Keppel had been assigned his doctor's thesis by
Berkey. The assignment was of the same nature. They were
building a dam on the Colorado River up the river 30 miles or so
from Austin, and here was this expanse of rock that was going to
be covered by this water. He wanted Keppel to go in there and
map this in detail and preserve it for science before it was
covered by this lake. And the student, that was his doctor's
assignment. Well, it happened to be that this whole region had
been mapped by the senior geologists of the Geological Survey
back in the early 1900's. So when the thesis came back, Johnson
looked it over, and concluded that all the student had done was
to verify what the USGS had done 30 years before. And it would
be very bad for the student to be accused of plagiarism and so
on.
- Doel: Right.
Hubbert: Well, it led to a kind of a crisis between Berkey and
Johnson. Johnson was pretty adamant on his stand on the thing,
and Berkey cried crocodile tears on his side. I was called in on
this thing at that stage, by Johnson. Well, one thing that came
out of the conversations or discussions or . . . there certainly
was a lot of hypocrisy on the part of Berkey over this or maybe
all around the place, of the bad reputation the student would get
in case that he should be accused of plagiarism. But the other
thing that came out between the cracks, which seemed, the thing
that was really bothering him
- Doel: Bothering Berkey?
Hubbert: And maybe the others too.
- Doel: And Johnson....
Hubbert: was, how the boy's father, Dr. Keppel, would feel
about it. Who Dr. Keppel was, I didn't know, and I'm not sure I
know now. I think he was the head of the Carnegie Institution.
- Doel: There was a Keppel at the Carnegie.
Hubbert: They were scared of him.
- Doel: That's interesting.
Hubbert: They were scared of the boy's father. Here the boy who
was done in, I mean, he'd done his job he was told to do. And he
was being made the pawn of this thing, he was mad about that, and
it would get back to his father. So I was finally assigned the
job of reading this thing over, and acting as a kind of referee
on it. I did so, and wrote a memorandum. I wrote essentially a
report of a judge on the bench, in which I pointed out that I had
reviewed the original USGS publications, and I had read the boy's
thesis. They were substantially the same, but I didn't think if
this was accepted as a thesis that it would damage the boy,
because I was sure that the outside geologists were plenty aware
of the mechanism by which students were assigned these jobs and
did them. I thought the responsibility came back to the profes sors, and not to the boy. Johnson read that over and his eyes
twinkled.
- Doel: What happened after that?
Hubbert: Well, somebody looking at it with a microscope or a
magnifying glass found some little wrinkle or other that this boy
in his thesis had mentioned that wasn't in the original Geologi cal Survey. Now, he should go back and enlarge this aspect of
it, suppress the other parts and enlarge this original part.
Another thing about this same time which illustrates the same
psychology. They came up with a proposal. There were a couple
of prominent people, geologists, who had been graduate students
at Columbia but had been turned down for their PhD for some
reason or other. They'd gone out and distinguished themselves in
spite of it. The hypocrisy in which this thing was couched here
these men had suffered all these years for lack of the benefit of
having a doctor's degree. It was decided that they would give
each one of them a doctor's degree, gratis. The first one of the
two accepted it as if he'd been done a favor. The second one
told them to go to hell! The second one was at this time I
believe the secretary of the AAPG, no, the AAAS. He was a
principal officer of the AAAS. And he told them to go to hell,
in effect. He said he needed the doctor's degree, in the early
stages, when it would have been useful. But he didn't use it
now, and the whole thing was a sham, or something of the sort.
- Doel: That's very interesting.
Hubbert: Meyerhoff. His name was Meyerhoff. But they
didn't they couldn't do it honestly, they always had to have this
subterfuge of pretending something that wasn't true. What it
amounted to was that their reputation was suffering from the fact
that they had not given degrees to these two men who had later
gone out and distinguished themselves. So they were trying to
cover up for their own past errors.
- Doel: How common was it for geophysicists in the 1930s not to
have gotten the doctor's degree? You were working for a time
before Chicago, and Griggs didn't have one.
Hubbert: There weren't any geophysicists, no geophysics appoint ments. Birch, for example, was in the geology department, and
working together with Bridgman. And so on. About that time,
meteorology had brought in C.G. Rossby to set up a modern
meteorology department at MIT. But that was entirely different.
Now it's all put together under earth sciences.
- Doel: But at the time it was segregated.
Hubbert: Totally separated. This little course I put on at
Chicago was in the geology department. At Columbia I was in the
geology department trying to teach geology to students who didn't
have physics or mathematics, or very few of them did. You
couldn't give anybody a degree with that kind of background. So
the whole thing was a futile operation. Well, the other thing
was, you had the Institute of Geophysics in Catholic University,
St. Louis, under Macelwane. Macelwane was a Jesuit seismologist,
a very good seismologist. You see, the Jesuit chain of schools
around the world set up seismological laboratories in the twen ties or maybe earlier. Apparently it suggests that they were a
little bit bored with their religious observances, and they
needed something to get their teeth into. Here they were, a
worldwide organization in seismology. It was a world-wide thing
where you made recordings all around the world. They were
beautifully set up to set up a seismological network, and did.
So you had the principal science of seismology in the United
States at that time was with the Jesuits. You had Fordham, you
had one in Cincinnati, you had St. Louis. There were a few
lesser ones scattered around the country. Then they had observa tories at various countries outside the US.
Well, Macelwane was a graduate student at Berkeley in the geology
department. He was studying seismology. And Caltech, I guess,
was just starting up shortly after this.
- Doel: Right, Caltech had funding from the Carnegie Institution
of Washington.
Hubbert: But Caltech was just starting in the twenties.
- Doel: That's right.
Hubbert: So Macelwane was a little earlier than that at Berke ley. Then he wrote this book in the 1930's on seismology, a very
good book, theoretical book. I have it on the shelf over here
(Gestures). That was a part of my rebelliousness, that there was
no provision for geophysics worth a damn in geology departments.
Either you had to upgrade the geology departments, or you had to
have a separate institute of geophysics.
And that gets around now to this question of geophysical educa tion that you alluded to. We're right up to that and this is a
good time to go into it.
- Doel: I think so, because you had written the major report in
1938 critical of geology curricula at the time. There was an
earlier report that you co-authored on geological education.
That was 1936. In 1938 you published "The Place of Geophysics in
a Geology Department."
Hubbert: Well, I don't remember an earlier paper than that. I
thought that was the first one.
- Doel: There's a note that you became involved in the AIME
committee beginning in 1936. Is that correct?
Hubbert: Maybe. But let me take on there. By this time, I was
just utterly frustrated, and fed up with the whole situation. I
was doing geophysical work during the summers for the Illinois
Geological Survey.
- Doel: That was in Illinois, the earth resistivity project?
Hubbert: Yes, the earth resistivity work, they called it. I
came through Chicago, probably about 1936, and visited Bastin,
the chairman of the department. I asked him, what is Chicago
doing about geophysics? And I got a reply something like this:
"Well, we just don't know what to do. Now, there's a young man
out at Minnesota, and we couldn't use him full time. We're
trying to make arrangements with the department of physics so
we'd take him half time and Department of Physics would have him
half time. He could give our course in geophysics, and the rest
in physics." Well, I just about went through the ceiling, for the
stupid lack of understanding of what the hell it was all about.
Here, they just wouldn't have time enough for this man to give
more than a 2 x 4 course in the geology department. At the same
time, the National Research Council was publishing a whole series
of monographs on various aspects of physics and the earth. They
had altogether about five or six volumes of this coming out just
at that time. Different aspects of geophysics. They also had
background of the journals: and The Beitrange in Geophysik in
Germany, more recently Zeitschnift fr Geophysik, series on
Handbuchdir Geophysik and so on.
- Doel: Right. How did that get organized?
Hubbert: They weren't doing one damn thing about this, and you
wouldn't know from the geology departments that it was in exis tence.
- Doel: Why did the NRC become so involved in it?
Hubbert: I don't know. It was before my time. This was the
early nineteen-twenties.
- Doel: But the geology departments weren't reacting to it?
Hubbert: They were ignoring it, for the most part. In one
volume, there was a geologist. Knopf was one of the authors. It
had to do with radioactive dating.
- Doel: Adolph Knopf from McGill?
Hubbert: Yes. But that was the only geologist involved in it,
as I remember. Geodesy was one. They had meteorology. You had
oceanography. You may have had seismology, I don't remember.
- Doel: All located primarily at institutions which weren't
universities.
Hubbert: Yes. So all right, this little conversation with
Bastin. I was just furious over the stupidity of this whole
thing. So I went back in my wrath, sat down and wrote a private
memorandum on the place of geophysics in the department of
geology, for Bastin. A memorandum to him. But it was a general
review of the scope of both geology and geophysics and so on. I
had a bunch of figures that I had drawn up, and I had taken them
to a blue print shop downtown to have reprints made of them, by
way of figures for this memorandum. I came by the headquarters
of the AIME, and said I was not a member of the AIME. Their
headquarters were down on 39th St. at the time, between Broadway
and Sixth Avenue, and their annual meeting was one of the big
events of the year. Columbia just practically shut the geology
department down for that week of the general meeting of the AIME.
Faculty and most of the graduate students went down to attend the
meeting.
Tape 12 side 2
Hubbert: Then the earlier thirties, when I was doing this work
for the Illinois Survey, there was a debate here at the AIME
called the section of geophysics. The chairman of that was a man
by the name of Kelly, who was a man in geophysics. Well, Kelly
wrote me a letter and requested that I have a paper that I could
give at the next meeting of the AIME. And so I wrote a little
paper on one of the various subjects that I'd dealt with in this
reconnaissance first summer. It touched on several different
things that we looked quickly into. Then we settled down in the
first part of the area. I had several, two or three papers in
that domain for the next two or three years. I was participat ing, but not a member of the AIME. In all respects I was treated
as if I were. It wasn't until about 1938 or so that I joined the
AIME.
- Doel: All right.
Hubbert: But I was a friend of the editorial staff or the
headquarters staff. We processed all the papers. Later on,
after I became a member, I was a member for two or three years of
the papers and publications committee, or whatever they called
it. This was the review committee for the whole Institute, the
highest level editorial review committee.
Anyhow, I came, I picked up those blueprints, and I came by AIME
headquarters to see Mr. Kennedy, one of the editors, about
something or other. I had this roll of blueprints under my arm,
and some question was raised about geophysical education. The
AIME had been asked for advice by somebody or other. I had the
roll of these blueprints, a dozen or so figures. I spread them
out, and said, "Well, here's a thing I've just written. It's
just a memorandum but it deals with these questions you're
asking." His eyes practically bugged out at this. "Couldn't we
have that for the AIME?" Well, I hadn't thought of it, but
maybe. He'd get in touch with Kelly and see what could be done.
He did, and Kelly immediately decided to have an entire session
on the subject of geophysical education at the next meeting, at
which I'd be the principal speaker. Then he'd run in two or
three other papers, on the spur of the moment, to make a whole
afternoon session of it.
- Doel: That's fascinating.
Hubbert: That's how this came about. I sent this memorandum on
to Bastin, but then I revamped it, with slight revision, for the
AIME purpose. Then, when it got into the machine of the AIME,
where there was a lot of political opposition in the AIME hierar chy. Not from the staff members, but a lot of people who were
very negative about a proposal by analysis.
- Doel: Which people in particular?
Hubbert: Oh, one of them was the head of the School of Mines at
Columbia, who had formerly been secretary of the AIME. He didn't
like one part of this. He was the guy who got me into Columbia
in the first place, but here I was criticizing what they were
doing at Columbia.
- Doel: Was that the reason for this criticism, because it re flected on what Columbia was doing?
Hubbert: I think so. I was very critical of what was going on,
and the lack of students, lack of preparation, lack of under standing of what the hell the subject was all about. This paper
went through an editorial battle of a year or so before it was
published.
- Doel: I see. OK. So then it finally did appear in 1938.
Hubbert: Yes. But it was delayed something like a year.
- Doel: Were you concerned it might not get published?
Hubbert: Yes, somewhat. In the meantime, the Society of Explo ration and Geophysics at Houston read this paper. Some of them
had been present and heard it. And they wanted to print it. In
the meantime it went through the AIME, but they were going to
print it unexpurgated in the Society of Exploration at Houston.
- Doel: What did you think could happen after the publication of
the article? Did you have specific ideas in mind of how to
change?
Hubbert: Well, yes, I had very concrete ideas. The paper itself
was very concrete.
- Doel: It spells out very clearly the role that you wanted
physics to play in departments of geology.
Hubbert: What I did was to examine the whole basics of what are
the scopes of these various entire gamut of science. So I simply
organized the whole. I said, a science is defined by the phenom ena it deals with. Let's start with physics: what does physics
deal with? In the broadest sense, matter and energy. Show me
any matter and energy in the universe that's excluded. So here's
physics, one of the least specialized and the most general of
sciences. Well, what about chemistry? It also deals with matter
and energy, but more with inner reactions largely of ions and
molecules and chemical compounds. So while it's more restrictive
in scope, it's still matter and energy within that scope. What
about astronomy? It also deals with matter and energy, but this
time with the cosmic universe, at the big end of the scale. What
about biology? Also matter and energy, but in this case limited
to organisms, plants and animals and their interrelation with
each other and with the inorganic nonbiologic environment.
Geology? Matter and energy, the earth. What is it's place?
Well, oh yes, biology, as I pointed out, here's physics at the
top, here's chemistry, here's astronomy, then you come down to
another layer. Chemists need to know certain aspects of physics,
thermodynamics and so on. But a physicist doesn't need to know
much chemistry. Astronomy over here, planetary motions, Newtoni an gravitation, then we go to stellar phenomena and so on. An
astronomer needs to know physics in a very broad sense. He also
needs to know something about the elements, chemistry. You come
down to the next layer. Take geology, where you deal with the
earth. It's a particular astronomical body, part of the solar
system. It has a gravitational field. It's a revolving body,
it's thermal, it's an energy problem, and so on. Then time is
involved, the geological history. It's the source of the only
known organisms in the universe, and you come over here to
biology. Well, they're dealing with organisms, but biochemistry
very much requires knowledge of chemistry. You're dealing with
physical phenomena at the same time, energy relations. There's a
kind of a mutual level between geology and biology. Geology is
the seat of the evolution of the organisms, and so on. Then in
this box I put a "bottom one" down here. I said this was poten tially the most general or rather, in this hierarchy, the most
dependent on all the rest of them. That would be social phenome na.
There you deal with mineral resources, you deal with biology.
Then up the ladder chemistry, physics, astronomy, they all come
together down here. Yet the people who are working in this
domain are doing none of those things. They know nothing about
it. If it is to develop as a proper science, it will have to
integrate the whole works.
- Doel: One of the more interesting arguments that you developed
in that paper was the idea that physics would help to simplify
geology. You argued that geology at that moment had a very broad
and cluttered structure.
Hubbert: Yes, I think that thesis was developed more particular ly by the presidential address. That the evolution of science
was not from simple to the complex, but from the chaotic to the
simple. I think that's in my GSA presidential address.
- Doel: That's where I've seen that argument as well, yes. What
kind of reaction did you get once that paper was published, among
university colleagues working on geophysical problems?
Hubbert: I would say probably universally negative, with a few
exceptions. I think I had one favorable letter from somebody.
- Doel: Just one?
Hubbert: The attitude among the geologists was defensive,
because I was simply putting them on the spot. So, the AIME then
established this committee on geophysical education. That
committee then started promoting further conferences on this
theme. They had two or three and published two or three papers,
over six or eight years. I think the final paper of that series
was in the early forties. I think that was written when I was
here in Washington in 1943, about. We wound up finally by
recommending things out of frustration, you might say. See, the
geologists dug in. One of the defenses from the geologists-and
these things showed up not in print so much as in bull sessions
in organizations and in meetings-was that what I was talking
about wasn't geology. So what is geology? Well, geology is what
geologists do. If you go out and map an area, pound the rocks
with a hammer and make a map, that's geology. But suppose that
you're dealing with the question of the mechanics of mountain
making, or a large number of other things? Well, that isn't
geology. So what you're dealing with there is an arbitrary
definition. The definition is being made by people being put on
the defensive, and they're excluding a large domain of phenomena
into no-man's-land. If it isn't geology, then what is it? So we
said, "All right, if you insist on that definition of geology,
then what we're talking about is not geology, we're talking about
physics of the earth." And we weren't going over semantics
rather than geophysics or geology, we're dealing with a bad term.
In particular we're dealing with the science of the earth. The
word geology means in its large sense the science of the earth.
Now, if geology is not the science of the earth, what we're
doing, what we need, is a science of the earth. As a matter of
fact, that's the origin of this term, geoscience, which is widely
used right now in the universities.
- Doel: Indeed. That's right.
Hubbert: Because the old term geology was too narrow and too
restricted.
- Doel: Certainly by the 1960's many departments changed the
titles to reflect this.
Hubbert: Thus in that last report we were in a state of almost
frustration with the negative attitude.
- Doel: Let me be certain of the chronology here. When you say
the last report, is this the 1943 report or the later reports
that you wrote?
Hubbert: The last AIME report, I think, was the report of the
committee on geophysical education. By this time we'd just
reached an impasse with the geologists. They said, "What you're
talking about isn't geology." We said, "All right, we're talking
about science of the earth." OK. Now, what we want in the
universities is a department that deals with the science of the
earth, and if the geology department isn't doing it, we need
another department outside of geology.
- Doel: That is what you and Strahley had advocated at that time,
creating separate departments.
Hubbert: Yes. So we wound up by, reluctantly, and with a
certain amount of tongue in cheek, recommending that they estab lish departments of geophysics to deal with the science of the
earth at the principal universities.
- Doel: You say tongue in cheek. You didn't expect that to occur?
Hubbert: Essentially, no. The geologists had dug their heels in
so thoroughly that we were saying, "Well, all right, if you guys
don't want to play ball let's see if we can play some other way."
It was partly the idea of smoking these geologists out of this
stalemate.
- Doel: I see.
Hubbert: That's the tongue in cheek aspect of it. But anyhow,
we did come out with this recommendation. This stirred up enough
interest that the National Research Council and the Geological
Society of America got involved. The National Research Council
set up the committee on geological education.
- Doel: That was the Joint Conference on the Committee of Geologic
Education?
Hubbert: I don't remember what all. Chester Longwell was
chairman of the division.
- Doel: That's correct.
Hubbert: I didn't know anything about it. I was just near to
breaking into the oil industry in Shell and I didn't know what
was going on. Chester Longwell came through Houston on a lecture
tour, one of these famous lecture tours. He came through about
November, and I invited him to dinner. Casually he mentioned,
"Did you know that the GSA is having a conference on geological
education at their next meeting?" I remarked that I didn't know,
and that I once had had some interest in that subject. I was
very glad to learn that something was going on. I don't remember
now how I got into this.
- Doel: This is the Chester Longwell committee meeting?
Hubbert: Yes. The first I knew about it was when Chester
dropped this rather casual remark. Anyhow, when this conference
did come up, I was one of the speakers on it. It wasn't a formal
policy meeting. It was run as a kind of a private or semi-official little conference all on its own.
- Doel: Because of the perceived importance of the issue to
geologists at the time?
Hubbert: Yes. And Aldrich had all the board it was the regular
scientific publication, but he had a little series of things that
are called "Interim Proceedings" or something or other which
dealt largely with Society affairs. He was using this thing for
publishing some of these discussions on geological education.
- Doel: That's right.
Hubbert: Anyhow, I don't know whether it was the first of these
conferences or the second one where I was one of the invited
speakers. I gave a talk at that meeting. I can't remember the
title of it.
- Doel: The conference that Chester Longwell chaired was the one
in 1946 held in conjunction with the AAPG, the first meeting.
Hubbert: I doubt if I was at that one. I didn't know about it.
- Doel: You joined later on, then?
Hubbert: Later on. I don't know what year it was, but we'll say
about 1945, 1946, was when I gave this talk at the conference
held that year.
- Doel: Do you remember where that meeting was taking place?
Hubbert: It may have been 1944.
- Doel: During the war?
Hubbert: Or just at the end of the war. When I gave this talk,
it was given off the cuff. I didn't have a prepared manuscript.
Then I actually wrote it up in my hotel room later on for the
stenotypist. A local firm had been employed. What happened was,
they had arranged for a stenotypist to take down these papers.
Then the same stenotypist came to my hotel room with a draft and
went over it with me.
- Doel: That's interesting.
Hubbert: That's how it happened. This was then published, along
with others of that conference, at some time during the following
year. I don't now remember much of what I said at that time, but
I do know this. I was a member of the GSA Council shortly after
that, and the GSA had a lawyer from a prominent law firm in
downtown New York. He sat in on these Council meetings, and I
recall that he reported to me that he had read this talk that I
had given that was published, and was tremendously impressed with
it. In fact, he recommended it to his son, who was about to
study geology or something. were set up in Shell for this new
research organization. I was making my first trip abroad in
1946. The president of Shell had read this paper. It had been
circulated in the interior ranks of the Shell Oil Company.
- Doel: That's interesting. This is the 1943 paper?
Hubbert: The paper that I gave at that meeting.
- Doel: OK.
Hubbert: When I was about to go to Europe on my maiden trip-to
both attend this conference in Paris but primarily to visit Shell
offices in the Hague and so on, a kind of sit-down-and-get-acquainted type of thing-the president surprised the hell out of
me. I was in his office, and he said, "Maybe you'd like to visit
the British universities, in view of your interest in geological
education."
- Doel: That's interesting.
Hubbert: "Christ, yes!" "OK, it will be done." He sent orders
immediately to the office to make me appointments in half a dozen
British universities.
- Doel: Is that so? That's remarkable.
Hubbert: I started out with Leeds, Cambridge, Oxford, Edinburgh,
Glasgow, and Aberdeen.
- Doel: How long were you at each of these places?
Hubbert: About a day and a night. Two days at the outside.
- Doel: Certainly enough to get strong impressions of how these
universities treated geophysics.
Hubbert: Yes. And in my discussions with the staff, after all,
I was officially introduced by Shell Oil Company, and Shell Oil
Company was a potential source of science positions, an actual
source in many cases. So I was handled with due respect.
- Doel: That's a very interesting point that you're raising. What
was it about the British universities that allows them to inte grate geophysics into the curricular more successfully than
universities in America?
Hubbert: Well, mainly this kind of thing. Take Cambridge.
Cambridge had three separate departments. They had a department
of geology, department of minerology, and a department of geo physics, each one under a professor.
- Doel: Set up like an institute, do you mean?
Hubbert: Yes. The history of that comes out of the structure of
British universities. The departments in British universities
are again autocratic. They have one professor. He's the boss of
the outfit, and all the rest are second class citizens.
- Doel: It's interesting to hear you saying this about the period
following the Second World War.
Hubbert: Yes, it was still there. That's the first time I had
ever encountered it. I wasn't familiar with, didn't know that
organizational structure. And I remember particularly Cambridge.
Some of the younger men told me quite frankly that they were all
looking for another job where they could be the professor and the
head of the department. They were all candidates for an opening
in some other university. So they'd have these three depart ments, they had three outstanding men in every one of those, at
least two of them. And each one wanted to be head of his own
department. That's how the departments at Cambridge were. Well,
I commented on this. I was asked by the company to write a
commentary on my visits with the universities and my impressions
and so on. I commented on the contrast between this and American
universities which had multiple professors and various ranks of
professorships, but it was a unified organization that at least
covered the spectrum in one single organization. They didn't
have one who was head of the department and the boss but was a
more or less cooperative thing.
Tape 13 side 1
Hubbert: Well, as far as my comments in that memorandum, part of
them upset some of our British colleagues who were very chauvin istic about their institutions.
- Doel: How did they get copies?
Hubbert: Well, the secretary sent them a copy.
- Doel: What were your impressions of the geophysical research
that you saw being done there?
Hubbert: Well, simply that in Cambridge it was very high class.
Jeffreys was an international geophysicist. He was the head of
geophysics at Cambridge. Well, he was the principal one that I
talked to there.
- Doel: What sort of a man was he?
Hubbert: He was a very nice person. Very nice wife. He was 50
years old or so. He'd been through the war and was looking a
little haggard. In fact, he had been also chairman of the
British Bureau of Standards. Of course he'd been heavily in volved in top secret military work during the war, and was
looking a little the worse for wear from it. Later on he was
given the Penrose medal of the Geological Society of America. He
was very competent, a very able man. In his personal work he'd
been in various fields including gravity work and so on. Every thing that I knew of him was good. But not very many here. Like
us, they had geology departments but not very much in geophysics.
Coming back to the education thing: about this same time, about
1948 or 1949, the Council of the Geological Society of America
passed what I regard as a rather pompous-sounding resolution. It
authorized the establishment of a committee on geological educa tion, with the assignment to report on the state of geological
education in North America. Well, it sounds silly, but the
background was that the Geological Society of America in its
corporate structure was supposed to deal with promoting geology
in North America. So they dragged that in to this committee.
- Doel: Was much of this motivated by concerns over the limited
role of geology during the war?
Hubbert: Yes, and this thing had been building up. This is
where Chester Longwell came in. The AIME stuff had all been done
before or principally before World War II. Longwell came in
after World War II. Now, what went on there? Well, I think it
came as something of a revelation to discover that in the war
work, where academics were brought in here for various government
types of scientific work, geologists were being looked down upon
as second class citizens. They didn't like it. And they were a
little restive about it. That explains it. That prompted their
reconsideration of where geology stands in this hierarchy of the
sciences.
- Doel: Was it also a concern over enrollments, over graduate
enrollments? They seem to have dropped off during the postwar
period.
Hubbert: Well, they were running into trouble in geologic
education. And you had things like the [unclear] building up
here, big strong geophysical centers, and so on. Other things
were beginning to blossom forth a little bit elsewhere. Well,
this committee that was set up consisted of three men, a man by
the name of George Thiel, of Minnesota, Hendricks, and me.
Thomas Hendricks. There were two Hendricks brothers. Tom was
the geologist. Well, Thiel was the chairman. When we began to
meet it developed that Thiel didn't know what it was all about.
He'd written something or other on geological education, I don't
know what, previously. He'd also done a little education over
something or other. This led to his appointment as chairman.
Well, by the time we got through the preliminary draft which
Thiel had written for our committee, it was really embarrassing.
So Tom and I got together and said, "Look, if we don't counteract
this by Thiel, this thing is going to be a disgrace. If the
committee is going to turn out anything at all, you and I have
got to write it." So we just took over. I don't know what we
told George but we indicated we just couldn't agree with his
draft, and we thought it didn't get to the heart of the problem.
We drafted it for him. We again wrote in a curriculum of what
geologists ought to know, what a geological curriculum should
contain. That a lot of chemistry, physics, mathematics and so on
is a basic integral part of geological education.
- Doel: Right.
Hubbert: That was written into the report as a positive recom mendation. Also, in parallel with this-or maybe before this
report was issued-we had one session. There was an idea circu lating around that they'd borrowed from chemistry. Chemistry had
a system of accrediting departments, and if a chemistry depart ment at a small school didn't measure up to the proper standards,
they weren't accredited. This was a very bad situation, in the
chemical hierarchy.
- Doel: And you wanted to bring this to geology departments?
Hubbert: It was proposed by certain members of the geological
profession, utilizing chemistry and also some engineering circles
as a precedent, that what we needed was accrediting in geology.
We had an entire session in which we had various pictures, pro
and con, over the subject of accrediting geology departments.
Out of that emerged from this was I think a rather general
awareness of our problem. It certainly was true in our commit tee, and I think it was true elsewhere, that the solution to the
problems that geology was facing was not a problem of bringing
the secondary schools up to the level of the best, it was bring ing the best schools to a higher level than they had ever been
before. In other words, there was no school in the country that
had a geology department up to the level that we thought was
possible and should be.
- Doel: You also remarked that there was no school in North
America teaching in all eight of the areas that the AGU had as
sections.
Hubbert: I remember I was doing these things for a long time.
Anyhow, that was one of our principal recommendations, that
accrediting was not the answer, it wasn't the problem. If we
brought them up to the level of the so-called best departments,
we'd still be a long distance from where we needed to go. The
best departments were not good enough.
- Doel: OK. What did you recommend, do you recall?
Hubbert: Well, I'm telling about the things I remember. The
recommendation was very positive. We recommended a curriculum,
as to the basic sciences it should have. We also recommended
that they progressively change the staff. You can't change a
geology department overnight, but certainly, as vacancies occur,
no matter what you call the subject, if it's taught by the same
professor it's still going to be the same subject. Merely
changing the title isn't going to change the content. So what we
said was that you need to hire a man with this kind of education al background to fill the vacancies as they occurred for existing
appointments. Therefore, as vacancies occur by retirement or
otherwise, you should pick the best of the younger generation in
terms of their education, and start replacing the old generation
with these young men. Let them organize the curriculum and their
courses.
Well, that was the essence of the presentation. This didn't
happen overnight, but it began to happen. In the case of Colum bia, for example, what you had at the same time was the estab lishment of the Lamont Laboratory with Maurice Ewing. Those boys
were just operating on a totally different basis from the old
geology department, and were essentially independent of it.
Gradually things began to percolate back to the geology depart ment. In Wisconsin, they hired one of Maurice Ewing's graduate
students, by the name George Ward. He was starting to teach
geophysics at the University of Wisconsin in Madison. And Ward
wrote a letter to the editor, published in GEOPHYSICS stating
what he'd been trying to do in geophysics and the frustrations
that he had, again because of a lack of background among the
students. I think I may have been editor of GEOPHYSICS at the
time. I wrote a commentary on Ward's letter to the editor and
said that what Ward did not point out that the responsibility for
this state of affairs rested squarely with the geology depart ments. I said they were simply going to have to change, they
were responsible for this state of affairs and were going to have
to change. Well, the geology departments were pretty embarrassed
over this remark, but they did start to change. Gradually we had
the same thing going on piecemeal in other places. UCLA set up
this Institute of Geophysics, headquartered at UCLA, but actually
technically covering the whole University of California system,
but with minor parts elsewhere. It was an all-university thing
under Slichter, who had been the head of geophysics at MIT.
- Doel: Was that when Slichter went to UCLA? Was the Institute
set up for him?
Hubbert: He was involved when the Institute was set up. I don't
remember the circumstances, but he was chairman of it. And from
MIT. Slichter, as I told you, was the son of Charles Slichter in
Madison. All right, that began to percolate in the geology
department. They got Dave Griggs brought out to UCLA, at the
Institute of Geophysics. Then it began to also percolate into
the geology departments. Similar things began to take place in
Berkeley, Stanford.
- Doel: What do you recall specifically what happened at Berkeley
and Stanford?
Hubbert: Well, in the case of Stanford, Stanford had this
something of [unclear] sciences or whatever it was called, and it
changed the name. It was a conglomerate consisting of the
geology department, the School of Mines, or the mining depart ment, geophysics department, petroleum engineering department.
- Doel: This is the state of affairs after the Second World War?
Hubbert: I don't know the past history of that. It used to be
just the geology department. But they had a close tie-in with
mines back from the beginning of the university. Hoover, for
example, and then Hoover's brother, were chairman of the school
of mines.
- Doel: That's interesting. I hadn't known that.
Hubbert: Hoover's brother spent his entire career at Stanford.
And he was a chairman of the school of mines or whatever it was
called up until his retirement. His son was a geologist from the
US Geological Survey, who wound up in Stanford around 1912. And
then there was an interesting character. He'd been with the
Geological Survey about 18 years. He did this elaborate series
of experiments on folded mountains. back in the early 1900s and
then he'd gotten himself pretty high up in the mines hierarchy,
or the Survey. I don't know whether he ever changed jobs, but he
was an operator of some influence. I was talking with an old
timer who was there at the time as a young man during the war,
retired from the Survey, about these various people that I knew
either just by name or in the case of [ ]. I know slightly
personally, and asked him, how did the Survey feel about him? He
said the younger men pretty thoroughly disliked him. That was
probably responsible for his leaving, he got so fed up with it.
But he went to Stanford, and he found there a very favorable
environment and he was a very great man in Stanford by the time
he finally died. His office now is practically a museum, pre served for posterity complete with his books and papers and what
not. The son of the Hoover who was the head of the mining school
married... no, the other way around: the son of Bailey Willis
married the daughter of the Hoover of the school of mines. I got
it confused... Geophysics, and George Thompson
- Doel: At Stanford, right.
Hubbert: Yes, was one of the professors.
- Doel: In the 1950s.
Hubbert: George was an MIT student. Well, George had asked me
informally some time before that, maybe a year or two before, if
I would come to Stanford. He wanted me to give a lecture to his
class in structural geology. So I was there with these lectures
I was giving, which were daily for several days. George came
around and wanted me to talk to his class in structural geology.
I said, "George, I'm so busy, I just don't see how I can. If I
talked to them it would be things that are already published, the
students are familiar with them already, and I just can't do it."
Well, in the little bull session I said, "Look, George, in
geology, structural geology, deformation of rocks, we're dealing
with finite strain. There are geological papers by our contempo raries dealing with this, by various authors, and most of them
are embarrassingly naive, erroneous. They just don't understand
what they're talking about. Now, actually the formula for finite
strain was worked out back in the middle of the last century by
various mathematicians in France and so on. So what we really
need to do is to dig up this original work done by these people
and simply translate it into geology." "What are you talking
about?" "Well," I said, "this is something some of your graduate
students might be interested in. It would be worth doing."
"Well, talk about that." So I did. I went over and talked to
them off the cuff about finite strain and its ramifications in
geology and so on. When I got through, one of the graduate
students-they were students in the course-came up and urgently
wanted to review his thesis with me. I said, "I'm sorry, I can't
do it, I'm leaving day after tomorrow." George came and wished I
would talk to this student. In the meantime, the dean of the
school was at the AIME meeting, the annual meeting in New York or
somewhere. He telephoned back and wanted me to stay on till he
got back because he wanted to talk with me on Saturday. So I
changed my schedule. I then reported back to George, OK, I could
see the student on Saturday morning. On Saturday morning the
student and George Thompson and Ben Page in geology and I went in
the classroom. I said, "Look, I probably don't understand
everything you've done, but why don't you go to the blackboard
and simply tell me what you've been doing. I'll be interested to
learn even if I may not understand it." So he went to the board.
His thesis was a study of the Los Angeles basins from the point
of view of finite strain.
- Doel: Really?
Hubbert: He'd done a superb job. He knew what he was doing. He
understood and the professors didn't.
- Doel: Who was he, by the way?
Hubbert: His name was David Willis. He was a grandson of this
[other] Willis I knew. Willis's son had married Hoover's daugh ter, and this was the guy.
- Doel: Remarkable.
Hubbert: Without going into the details, I was so impressed that
when the dean came back, Charlie Clark, I said, "Look, I wasn't
recruiting, but I need a personal assistant for this thing I'm
working on. I can't tell you that what I'll be doing is terribly
interesting and I can't tell you exactly what I need, except I
want a guy who can do anything I can do only better, and that's
this guy." Well, he was interested. I wound up hiring him and
he worked for me for two years. Then he took a job in the
Lockheed Company in their Aberdeen satellite work, as assistant
to the research director. He finally wound up in charge of
computers for Lockheed. And then he quit Lockheed and set
himself up a little company which he sold at a profit. He's been
operating independently ever since. He lives there in the
neighborhood of Stanford. Atherton.
Let me make a digression, while we're on geological education.
What was going on, Stanford had a small geophysics department.
- Doel: This is again right after the war, we're talking about
now?
Hubbert: Well, no, this was during the fifties.
- Doel: OK.
Hubbert: When I went there as a visiting professor in 1952, just
one quarter, they wanted me to give their course in oil geology.
I proposed instead to give a course on the physics of underground
fluids, the migration, trapped fluids, etc. And I did. This was
a fairly advanced course for advanced undergraduate students and
graduate students, and was attended by geologists and ground
water hydrologists among others, civil engineering students and
civil engineering students, and geophysicists. It was a pretty
broad cross-section. Well, I gave this course then for the next
seven or eight years, and roughly the same course and research.
Again this illustrates the evolution that had taken place in
geology since World War II. This was a fairly advanced course in
theoretical physics in part. Not all geologists could take it,
but there were geologists who were taking it, and we had geophys icists, petroleum engineers and civil engineers who came in for
this. This kind of thing was going on. It was going on at
Caltech, of course, and in UCLA, and Berkeley it's hard to say, I
don't really know about their geology department, because when I
was out there I was headquartered in the department of industrial
engineering and computer sciences.
- Doel: Right, this is the early 1970's when you were there.
Hubbert: Yes, 1973. And I only saw the geologists at cocktail
parties. With one exception, I talked to the geology student
group, organization.
- Doel: I want to turn to that later. I'm curious what your
impression was of the role that the new government funding played
in establishing geophysics after the Second World War. Certainly
there were funds for oceanography, and for seismology.
Hubbert: I think it was rather secondary. I think the funding
went along with the people, and if you had people who needed
geophysical funding you had to have geophysical people first.
I was a member of the Geophysical Advisory Panel of the Office of
Naval Research after the war. They had a bunch of money left
over and didn't know what to do with it. They were organizing an
advisory committee, or a series of advisory committees, to advise
them on disposition of this.
- Doel: You were a member of the earth sciences group?
Hubbert: I was a member of the earth sciences group. Then that
was succeeded by the National Science Foundation, and I was a
charter member of the Earth Sciences Advisory Panel for the
National Science Foundation for a total term of five or six
years. After the first year of shake-down, we drew straws to see
who would be the chairman. I got the long straw and I was the
chairman of that for the rest of my tenure, which was about three
or four years.
- Doel: That was in the NSF?
Hubbert: NSF, right.
- Doel: What was it like during the time that it was the ONR? Do
you remember any particular discussions over what would be funded
in earth sciences?
Hubbert: Well, there was a lot of requests for money. So it was
evaluation of projects. There wasn't much planning as to what
ought to be done. It was largely responding to requests of what
people wanted to do. And that same thing went on in the NSF.
- Doel: Did you have particular projects you wanted to see funded
or preferred to see funded within geophysics?
Hubbert: Again, we weren't taking the initiative on that. We
were only passing judgment on these proposals.
- Doel: Whether it was good science or not.
Hubbert: Yes, whether it showed promise, how it compared with
others if you only had so much money and had requests for twice
that amount, things you had to weigh and consider, one against
the other, and in particular throw out the weaklings and incompe tents.
- Doel: Do you recall roughly what percentage of applications were
funded during that time?
Hubbert: Well, I can't say so much for the Office of Naval
Research, because that only lasted a year or two when I was on
it. But I was on the NSF for about four or five years.
Tape 13 side 2
Hubbert: In NSF were various competitive situations, to which I
reacted very strongly negatively. And that is, you'd have a
professor that had a scheme of things. The applicants for the
thing, if there were two or more principal investigators-these
had to be looked at with considerable caution, because very
probably the principal investigators were going to hire somebody
to do the work. It was going to be the graduates or whoever it
might be. He wasn't going to do the work, he was going to hire
somebody to do the work.
There were some pretty rank cases of that sort. The worst that I
recall, I won't give you the name of the school, but there was a
certain school in which two professors listed themselves as
principal investigator on this proposal. What they were going to
work on was rock mechanics, as I remember it. One of them, his
past experience was in petroleum engineering, as I recall, and
another one mine safety and ventilation. What are they going to
do? They're going to build a half million dollar building and
hire men to do the work.
- Doel: You wrote about this in '63.
Hubbert: Right. They didn't get the grant. But that pattern
repeated itself often enough to be a nuisance.
- Doel: Was that something you discussed with others who were
doing similar evaluations within the NSF?
Hubbert: Well, our committee set a standard in the NSF, on what
you might call scientific integrity.
- Doel: How was that?
Hubbert: One of the hardest boiled committees in the whole
establishment, to the great annoyance of the director.
- Doel: Really?
Hubbert: Yes. None of the other people were comparable with us.
- Doel: In setting high standards?
Hubbert: Most of the damned committees apparently didn't do
anything, as far as actually evaluating projects was concerned.
The NSF hierarchy at that time had a man on the staff who was
called program director. Or Manager, or whatever it was. Their
original idea was that we'd just kind of be a board of advisors,
informal advisors, and the managing director would really do all
the decisions. I said, nothing doing. If we're going to be a
board of advisors, we're going to read these reports and we're
going to advise you about them, pro and con. Well, it turned out
that in order to do this, they'd just send us projects. Here, a
project comes by. Well, now we've got this advisory body and
here Joe Doaks over here on the committee, he wants to get his
friend's project through. We said, nothing of the sort. We'll
not recommend any project that isn't recommended by the entire
panel. In other words, it's a panel recommendation, not an
individual, because most of us don't know enough about all of it.
None of us know about all these things, but our collective
judgment, on both the people and the subjects, is far better than
any individual could do.
- Doel: Outside of geology and astronomy, were the other commit tees evaluating on this basis?
Hubbert: I think they were operating on this basis of Joe Doaks.
It was a kind of a minor advisory board without doing any real
work. Well, we said, furthermore we can't do this by mail.
We've got to meet. They didn't have any travel funds, so they
said. So we struggled along with that for a while. We finally
did get enough money so we could get together about once a year
and go over this whole slate. But we stood our ground on this.
I think we exercised a considerable amount of influence ultimate ly in the NSF.
- Doel: Was Alan Waterman director at the time?
Hubbert: Yes.
- Doel: Do you recall any particular discussions with him about
standards?
Hubbert: Well, not much in detail, but he didn't like what we
were doing. It wasn't what he had in mind.
- Doel: What did he have in mind?
Hubbert: I think he had in mind that we'd be kind of a kind of a
front, and the staff would make their own decisions. All we'd do
is act as a kind of a facade for it. It wasn't their idea.
- Doel: That's very interesting.
Hubbert: One time it came to the point where we actually ballot ed, whether to resign en masse.
- Doel: Indeed?
Hubbert: That scared them so bad that when I came up to a
meeting of the advisory committee of the Research Council on
Atomic Wastes, they had one of their staff men come by with an
olive branch. Before we got together.
- Doel: How many people were involved in that committee?
Hubbert: The committee was about eight or ten people. I don't
remember how many.
- Doel: Just within the geological sciences?
Hubbert: Yes. They had different corresponding committees for
the other sciences.
- Doel: Were the other sections also considering resigning at the
same time?
Hubbert: No, they didn't have this conflict. We wanted to set
these standards. And the standards were not what Waterman
wanted. We finally had a showdown over it.
- Doel: And do you feel that you were able to succeed in estab lishing that as the standard?
Hubbert: Well, I think we had a lasting influence.
- Doel: What I'd like to do is go back to a few questions about
the committee work you were involved in during the Second World
War. The American Geological Institute, the AGI was also set up
then. Were you involved in the planning for the Institute?
Hubbert: Well, I was involved not in the initiation, but at a
later stage when I was president of the Geological Society of
America, in 1962. The AGI was undergoing some revision of its
structure, constitution and so on. We had in the Geological
Society a very difficult problem, when the man who succeeded
Aldrich was a dictatorial type
- Doel: Who was this?
Hubbert: A man by the name of Betts. He had damn near wrecked
the organization. We had to fire him.
- Doel: When was it that Betts came on? The 1950's?
Hubbert: No, it was either late 1950's or early 1960's.
- Doel: OK, we can check that.
Hubbert: It had really got bad by 1962. But anyhow, here was oh
yes, Henry Aldrich. Jean Paul Henry worked like a slave on this
job, and we wanted to honor him by making him a member of the
Council, which is a member of the board of directors. They'd
done so. Well, that was a harmless thing as far as Henry Aldrich
was concerned, but it wasn't harmless with his successor. His
successor began to use his corporate position in the organiza tion. This was the time when corporations were having this
menace of this was before the [modern era of] takeovers, but the
takeover of stockholders, proxies. He even had the idea of
having a stockholders' proxy for the GSA of throwing out the
management.
- Doel: The Council?
Hubbert: Top of the thing. Well, I won't go into that, except
that was the background. The AGI was about to get into the same
situation. In their revised constitution they had again the
president or whatever his title was as a member of the board of
officers. That's a very bad situation. So I put my feet down
over that, and said, nothing doing. Anybody drawing a salary is
an employee and not an officer of the organization. Keep out of
that one. And they did.
- Doel: What was the initial purpose of the AGI?
Hubbert: Oh, it was promoted by, again, the sense that geology
wasn't getting the proper recognition it deserved. One of the
principal promoters of that was Carey Croneis, and Carey Croneis
was a promoter all of his life anyway. If he wasn't promoting
one thing, he was promoting something else. And so this was one
of his favorites. It was really a public relations thing, to
enhance the so-called... what do public relations people call it?
Not the image, the
- Doel: The perception?
Hubbert: Yeah. They have a word for it. It was to upgrade
public perception of geology. So that was how the thing started.
But it had a legitimacy of sorts, because it ultimately developed
a kind of coordination of what was going on in a whole series of
science and engineering societies. It further served the useful
purpose of certain types of publications, pulling together things
of common interest, and get out a report or a volume on that.
But basically it isn't a terribly important organization, never
was.
- Doel: OK. Another thing I'm curious about is the relationship
between the AIME and the AGU during the war and afterwards? Was
there much contact between them?
Hubbert: Oh no, they were miles apart then. They had little
interest in each other.
- Doel: There were never any talks of having joint meetings or in
any way bringing the members of the two societies together?
Hubbert: No. The AGU was only interested with respect to
scientific seismology and meteorology, oceanography, geodesy and
so on. In fact, it started out originally as the American
chapter of the International Union of Geology and Geophysics,
Geodesy and Geophysics, I mean.
- Doel: That's right.
Hubbert: Largely the geophysics part of the AIME came in entire ly from the few individuals who were working on mining geophysics
and in the oil industry got into it. It was exploration geophys ics.
- Doel: OK. There's one other issue from the 1930's that I wanted
to talk to you about. Then it might be a good time for us to end
for today. It was in 1938 that you married Miriam Graddy Berry.
I'm curious how you met your wife. Could you tell me about that?
Hubbert: I was working for the USGS down in Kentucky.
- Doel: In 1938?
Hubbert: In 1934.
- Doel: OK. This was summer work?
Hubbert: Yes. And I met some people down there who were mining
geophysicists and geologists. His father was running a little
feldspar mine, and he was associated with it in the dark days of
the Depression. I met these people, had dinner with them a few
times. They had this friend of the woman; they'd been school
mates together in Kentucky. She was now in New York, and some body suggested we meet. So I came back to New York, with this
kind intermediary, and we did meet. And we're still around.
- Doel: Did she have an interest in science?
Hubbert: Well, she was a medical secretary for a big pharmaceu tical company. She was secretary to the director of the medical
department, or something of the sort. In that connection, she
wasn't just typing, but was reading scientific literature just as
a part of her job. Actually she had a good deal of official
correspondence, and wrote the letters herself. Doctors and what
not, over questions, because she knew what the company was doing
and the scientific literature in the field. She did a good deal
of routine correspondence with the medical profession just in
that capacity. Then later on, that company, I believe, moved to
New Jersey. She didn't want to go to New Jersey, so she switched
to another company. The one company was a subsidiary of the
German I.G. Farben. She was with them then for several years.
At the end of that, I don't remember...but one of the whiskey,
alcohol distilling companies tried to go into penicillin.
Schenley. They were starting from scratch, and hired a medical
director. She worked for him.
- Doel: OK. Had you talked with her often about issues in your
scientific work? Had you shared much with her?
Hubbert: Well, she typed most of it. The JG paper, she typed it
at night, and most of the other papers. I didn't have a secre tary at the university. I couldn't type but with two fingers. I
wrote my own letters, make a mistake, `x' it out and go on. But
the paper on scale models, the GSA headquarters typed that.
- Doel: Did they? Was that unusual?
Hubbert: Yes. But they did it.
- Doel: OK. We've been talking now for almost three hours.
Hubbert: We'd better stop. We'd better sign off.